Get Fortinet FCSS_SOC_AN-7.4 Exam Practice Questions - Real and Updated

Answer : A, D

Understanding the Playbook Configuration:

The playbook named 'Update Asset and Identity Database' is designed to update the FortiAnalyzer Asset and Identity database with endpoint and user information.

The exhibit shows the playbook with three main components: ON_SCHEDULE STARTER, GET_ENDPOINTS, and UPDATE_ASSET_AND_IDENTITY.

Analyzing the Components:

ON_SCHEDULE STARTER: This component indicates that the playbook is triggered on a schedule, not on-demand.

GET_ENDPOINTS: This action retrieves information about endpoints, suggesting it interacts with an endpoint management system.

UPDATE_ASSET_AND_IDENTITY: This action updates the FortiAnalyzer Asset and Identity database with the retrieved information.

Evaluating the Options:

Option A: The actions shown in the playbook are standard local actions that can be executed by the FortiAnalyzer, indicating the use of a local connector.

Option B: There is no indication that the playbook uses a FortiMail connector, as the tasks involve endpoint and identity management, not email.

Option C: The playbook is using an 'ON_SCHEDULE' trigger, which contradicts the description of an on-demand trigger.

Option D: The action 'GET_ENDPOINTS' suggests integration with an endpoint management system, likely FortiClient EMS, which manages endpoints and retrieves information from them.

Conclusion:

The playbook is configured to use a local connector for its actions.

It interacts with FortiClient EMS to get endpoint information and update the FortiAnalyzer Asset and Identity database.

Fortinet Documentation on Playbook Actions and Connectors.

FortiAnalyzer and FortiClient EMS Integration Guides.

Answer : B

Understanding the Playbook Configuration:

The playbook 'FortiMail Sender Blocklist' is designed to manually input email addresses or IP addresses and add them to the FortiMail block list.

The playbook uses a FortiMail connector with the action ADD_SENDER_TO_BLOCKLIST.

Analyzing the Playbook Execution:

The configuration and actions provided show that the playbook is straightforward, starting with an ON_DEMAND STARTER and proceeding to the ADD_SENDER_TO_BLOCKLIST action.

The action description indicates it is intended to block senders based on email addresses or domains.

Evaluating the Options:

Option A: Using GET_EMAIL_STATISTICS is not required for the task of adding senders to a block list. This action retrieves email statistics and is unrelated to the block list configuration.

Option B: The primary reason for failure could be the requirement for a fully qualified domain name (FQDN). FortiMail typically expects precise information to ensure the correct entries are added to the block list.

Option C: The trust level of the client-side browser with FortiAnalyzer's self-signed certificate does not impact the execution of the playbook on FortiMail.

Option D: Incorrect connector credentials would result in an authentication error, but the problem described is more likely related to the format of the input data.

Conclusion:

The FortiMail Sender Blocklist playbook execution is failing because FortiMail is expecting a fully qualified domain name (FQDN).

Fortinet Documentation on FortiMail Connector Actions.

Best Practices for Configuring FortiMail Block Lists.

Answer : B

Understanding the Threat Hunting Data:

The Threat Hunting Monitor in the provided exhibits shows various application services, their usage counts, and data metrics such as sent bytes, average sent bytes, and maximum sent bytes.

The second part of the exhibit lists connection attempts from a specific source IP (10.0.1.10) to a destination IP (8.8.8.8), with repeated 'Connection Failed' messages.

Analyzing the Application Services:

DNS is the top application service with a significantly high count (251,400) and notable sent bytes (9.1 MB).

This large volume of DNS traffic is unusual for regular DNS queries and can indicate the presence of DNS tunneling.

DNS Tunneling:

DNS tunneling is a technique used by attackers to bypass security controls by encoding data within DNS queries and responses. This allows them to extract data from the local network without detection.

The high volume of DNS traffic, combined with the detailed metrics, suggests that DNS tunneling might be in use.

Connection Failures to 8.8.8.8:

The repeated connection attempts from the source IP (10.0.1.10) to the destination IP (8.8.8.8) with connection failures can indicate an attempt to communicate with an external server.

Google DNS (8.8.8.8) is often used for DNS tunneling due to its reliability and global reach.

Conclusion:

Given the significant DNS traffic and the nature of the connection attempts, it is reasonable to conclude that DNS tunneling is being used to extract confidential data from the local network.

Why Other Options are Less Likely:

Spearphishing (A): There is no evidence from the provided data that points to spearphishing attempts, such as email logs or phishing indicators.

Reconnaissance (C): The data does not indicate typical reconnaissance activities, such as scanning or probing mail servers.

FTP C&C (D): There is no evidence of FTP traffic or command-and-control communications using FTP in the provided data.

SANS Institute: 'DNS Tunneling: How to Detect Data Exfiltration and Tunneling Through DNS Queries' SANS DNS Tunneling

OWASP: 'DNS Tunneling' OWASP DNS Tunneling

By analyzing the provided threat hunting data, it is evident that DNS tunneling is being used to exfiltrate data, indicating a sophisticated method of extracting confidential information from the network.

Answer : C

Role of a Threat Hunter:

A threat hunter proactively searches for cyber threats that have evaded traditional security defenses. This role is crucial in identifying sophisticated and stealthy adversaries that bypass automated detection systems.

Key Responsibilities:

Proactive Threat Identification:

Threat hunters use advanced tools and techniques to identify hidden threats within the network. This includes analyzing anomalies, investigating unusual behaviors, and utilizing threat intelligence.

Understanding the Threat Landscape:

They need a deep understanding of the threat landscape, including common and emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by threat actors.

Advanced Analytical Skills:

Utilizing advanced analytical skills and tools, threat hunters analyze logs, network traffic, and endpoint data to uncover signs of compromise.

Distinguishing from Other Roles:

Investigate and Respond to Incidents (A):

This is typically the role of an Incident Responder who reacts to reported incidents, collects evidence, and determines the impact.

Collect Evidence and Determine Impact (B):

This is often the role of a Digital Forensics Analyst who focuses on evidence collection and impact assessment post-incident.

Monitor Network Logs (D):

This falls under the responsibilities of a SOC Analyst who monitors logs and alerts for anomalous behavior and initial detection.

Conclusion:

Threat hunters are essential in a SOC for uncovering sophisticated threats that automated systems may miss. Their proactive approach is key to enhancing the organization's security posture.

SANS Institute, 'Threat Hunting: Open Season on the Adversary'

MITRE ATT&CK Framework

CISA Threat Hunting Guide

NIST Special Publication 800-61, 'Computer Security Incident Handling Guide'

By searching for hidden threats that elude detection, threat hunters play a crucial role in maintaining the security and integrity of an organization's network.

Answer : B, D, E

Overview of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs): Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) are pieces of evidence that suggest a system may have been compromised. These can include unusual network traffic patterns, the presence of known malicious files, or other suspicious activities.

FortiAnalyzer's Role: FortiAnalyzer aggregates logs from various Fortinet devices to provide comprehensive visibility and analysis of network events. It uses these logs to identify potential IoCs and compromised hosts.

Relevant Log Types:

DNS Filter Logs:

DNS requests are a common vector for malware communication. Analyzing DNS filter logs helps in identifying suspicious domain queries, which can indicate malware attempting to communicate with command and control (C2) servers.

IPS Logs:

Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) logs detect and block exploit attempts and malicious activities. These logs are critical for identifying compromised hosts based on detected intrusion attempts or behaviors matching known attack patterns.

Web Filter Logs:

Web filtering logs monitor and control access to web content. These logs can reveal access to malicious websites, download of malware, or other web-based threats, indicating a compromised host.

Why Not Other Log Types:

Email Filter Logs:

While important for detecting phishing and email-based threats, they are not as directly indicative of compromised hosts as DNS, IPS, and Web filter logs.

Application Filter Logs:

These logs control application usage but are less likely to directly indicate compromised hosts compared to the selected logs.

Detailed Process:

Step 1: FortiAnalyzer collects logs from FortiGate and other Fortinet devices.

Step 2: DNS filter logs are analyzed to detect unusual or malicious domain queries.

Step 3: IPS logs are reviewed for any intrusion attempts or suspicious activities.

Step 4: Web filter logs are checked for access to malicious websites or downloads.

Step 5: FortiAnalyzer correlates the information from these logs to identify potential IoCs and compromised hosts.

Fortinet Documentation: FortiOS DNS Filter, IPS, and Web Filter administration guides.

FortiAnalyzer Administration Guide: Details on log analysis and IoC identification.

By using DNS filter logs, IPS logs, and Web filter logs, FortiAnalyzer effectively identifies possible compromised hosts, providing critical insights for threat detection and response.